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Developing countries rely on short-term trade  available: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India,
credits for imports of several essential consumer  Kenya, Mexico, and Turkey. They found that:
goods, including medicines and basic food
supplies. The credits also facilitate export-related  *  Countries with greater growth prospects
transactions.  (higher investment-to-GONP  ratios) get more
short-term credit.
The mechanisms commercial banks use to
provide trade credits to developing countries are  *  Short-term credits are usually meant to
complex and costly. Even a temporary break in  finance countries with significant trade deficits.
the flow of short-term credit can seriously hurt a
country's business. But since short-term trade  *  Higher levels of extemal indebtedness (as a
credits can be structured so that they involve few  ratio of total debt outstanding to GNP) are
risks to a bank and at the same time are very  generally coupled with higher levels of short-
costly to the debtor, they are generally the last  tenn external indebtedness to commercial banks
forms of credit to be cut and the first to be  (a high ratio of short-term debt to GNP).
reestablished in debt-distressed developing
countries.  *  Country-specific factors affect the volume
of short-term lending available to a country. If
To gauge the likelihood of continued short-  all else is equal, some countries (such as Kenya)
tenn trade-related financial flows to developing  find it harder to get short-term commercial bank
countries, Gooptu and Peria examined the factors  financing than others (such as Mexico). Further
that affect such short-tenn commercial bank  analysis is needed to determine which factors
loans. Little literature was available on the  account for these differences, but possibilities to
subject. Only recently have relevant data become  be explored include a country's track record in
available, and further analysis would be facili-  implementing World Bank/IMF structural
tated by more useful disaggregation of the data  adjustment programs; the existence of domestic
that are made available.  financial markets; and orderly resolution of the
country's external debt burden in line with a
Gooptu and Peria studied relevant data over  thoughtful strategy for managing external debt.
time for seven countries for which data were
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Developing  countries  rely  on  short-tern  trade  credits  for  several  essential
consumer  goods  imports,  such  as  medicines  and  basic  food supplies:  They  are also
vital  in  facilitating  transactions  related  to  the  country's  exports.  The mechanisms
adopted  in  the  provision  of  trade  credits  from  commercial  banks  to  developing
countries  are often very  complex and  costly  for  borrowers  in  developing  countries.
A break  in  the  flow  of short  term  trade  lines,  even  a  temporary  one,  could  have
severe  adverse  implications  on  the  business  of trade  in  the  developing  countries.
Given  that  short-term  trade  credits  can easily  be structured  such  that  they  involve
few risks for the banks while being extremely  costly to the debtor,  they are generally
the  last  forms of credit  to be cut  and  the  first to be r-established  in debt-distressed
developing  countries.'  In an endeavor  to gauge  the likelihood  of future  short  term
trade-related  financial  flows  from  commercial  banks  to  developing  countries,  the
objective  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  determinants  of  short  term  lending  by
commercial banks  to the less developed  countries  (LDCs).
Literature  on this subject as well as reliable data for LDCs is scarce, partly due
to  the  fact  that  countries  were  not  required,  until  recently,  to  report  detailed
information  on  their  short  term  obligations  to commercial  banks  by  the  reporting
agencies  (such  as  the  World  Bank's  Debtor  Reporting  System).  Available
information  was  sketchy  and  often  too  aggregate  to  allow  for  any  meaningful
I  See Goopu and Brwu  (1991)  for details on the different types of instruments  used in the provision  of short terin trade
lines from commercial  banks to the less-developed  countries.-3-
analysis. Even though these factors have made our task difficult, the availability of
more recent data  on a few LDCs have made it worthwhile to embark on a more
rigorous  analysis of the  determinants of short  term commercial bank lending  to
developing countries.
In this paper,  the factors that significantly affect short-term lending by banks
to seven LDCs, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya, Mexico and Turkey,
are examined in an endeavor to determine whether these have changed over time
and across countries. We begin with a brief discussion on the trends  in lending to
LDCs fromt  private creditors, in general, in Section I  of the paper, and focus on the
behavior of short-term commercial bank lending to LDCs, in particular,  in Section
M  of the paper. The circumstances  in the seven countries that have been selected for
this study  are highlighted  in this context. Alternative hypotheses on the possible
determinants  of short-term  commercial bank  lending  to LDCs are postulated  in
Section IV. These hypotheses  have been  formulated on the basis of our  findings
from numerous  interviews  with market participants  in financial institutions  and
officials in the central banks of certain LDCs. The results of the econometric analysis
using  pooled cross-section and  time series data  for our  sample  of  countries  are
provided in Section V of the paper. The basic conclusions and recommendations for
areas of further analysis in this context are provided in Section VI.  A discussion on
the alternative sources and definitions of the data used and a list of variables used in
our  econon:-.  analysis  of short-term  credits  is provided  in Appendix  1.
II.  Overview  of  Trends  in  Lending  to LDCs
When  speaking  of  the  sources  of  external  financing  to  less  developed
countries  (LDCs), history  has been known  to repeat  itself.  The situation  in  the-4-
nineties mimics that of the sixties, when official credctors  played a dominant role in
this area.  Before 1970,  more than 50% of the medium and long term (MLT)  external
debt of developing countries was owed .u official creditors while commercial bank
debt and bonds accounted for about 32%  and 5% respectively. 2 In the 1970s  and early
1980s,  financing from private creditors in the form of direct syndicated lending (as
opposed  to equity participation) to developing countries increased dramatically as
the market for international bank  credit gained a competitive advantage over the
securities markets in channeling  the surpluses  of oil exporting  countries  toward
LDCs. By 1982,  the pre-1970  situation was reversed with commercial banks holding
50%  of the MLT  external debt of LDCs, while official  creditors held 35%  of the debt. 3
After 1982,  against a background of high interest rates and deteriorating terms
of trade combined with inappropriate  policies and drastic cut-backs in new lending
by  commercial banks,  a  number  of  LDC borrowers  underwent  debt  servicing
problems and were forced to enter into repeated debt rescheduling agreements and
concerted new money exercises.  In  total, medium  and  long term  commitments
from commercial banks to developing countries fell from $42 billion in 1982 to an
average of $14 billion per annum between 1983-88. By 1988  the share of commercial
banks in long term external debt for developing countries as a whole 4 had  fallen to
around 40%.
The fall in volume of syndicated loans to LDCs reflects the determination of
international  banks  to reduce  their  exposure  to developing  countries,  not  only
through  drastic  reductions  in  the  pace  of  lending  but  also  through  various
2  International  Capital  Markets.  Development  and Prospects.  May 1991.  IMF Publicadons.
3  ibid
4  ibidinnovative market related financial engineering techniques such as deot conversion
schemes.  To a large extent, the banks increasing concern with exposure levels has
stemmed  from  the  pressure  exerted  on  the  them  by  the  terms  of  the  B3asle
Agreement of July 1988. This agreement  addresses the  principles  concerning  the
international  convergence of  capital  measurement  and  capital  standards  in  the
financial institutions  of  the  Group of  Ten nations.  These principles  set  target
figures for the ratio of capital to a risk-weighted sum of assets and off-balance sheet
exposure, culminating in a level of 8% by 1992.5 Many of the  major banks  need to
increase their capital in order to meet the targets. Ways of achieving such increases
include higher profits and new issues of equity, neither of which is compatible with
new lending to LDCs.
The curtailment of new bank lending to LDCs  has increased the role of official
creditors in the international capital market arena.  Official  debt including the use of
IMF credit now accounts for about 46% of the debt of LDCs compared with 32% in
1984.6  At  the  same time,  the  critical debt  situation  and  the highly  unfavorable
impact of the "debt overhang"  on the economic performance and living standards
in  developing  countries  has  given  fresh  impetus  to  al?  -3rnative approaches  to
solving the debt problem.  Prominent among these proposals was the provision of
debt relief through the reduction in the stock of debt or in debt service payments.
These were  the  central  features  of  the  initiative launched  by  the  United  States
Secretary of the Treasury - Nicholas Brady in March 1989.  The most important debt
restructuring  scherres implemented under the auspices of  "Brady Initiative" were
S  United  Nations  Conference  on Trade  and DevelopmenL  Trade and Development  Report.  1989.  United Nations
Publications.
6  World  Debt  Tables 1990.91.  External  Debt of Developing  Countries.  Volume 1. World  Bank Publications..6.
those  of  the  Philippines,  Mexico  and  Costa  Rica,  which  reduced  the  stock  of
commercial  bank debt for the three countries  taken together  by $9.5 billion.7
A  notable  feature  of  recent  agreements  is  the  paucity  of  new  concerted
lending  by  private  creditors  to  LDCs.  Banks have  responded  to  the  pressure  on
them  to supply  resources  by searching  for alternatives  to  new  money,  a search  that
gave  rise to a variety  of instruments  tuned  to the specific interests  and  constraints  of
conimercial  banks,  such  as  debt  conversions,  exchange  offers  with  or  without
collateralization,  debt buy-backs and  exit instruments.
In  particular,  debt  conversion  operations  have  become  very  important
recently,  especially  in  conjunction  with  ongoing  privatization  programmes,  and
may be expected  to  continue  to be strong  for several  countries  in  the period  ahead.
Debt  equity  conversion  provisions  have  become  important  components  of  recent
bank  financing  packages  as a result  of  accelerated  efforts  by  LDC governments  to
attract  foreign  investors.  The Argentinean  government,  for example,  has  sharply
stepped  up  the  pace  of  debt-equity  conversions  as  it  seeks  to  privatize  and  re-
capitalize  the  country's  state-owned  enterprises.8 Recent  debt  conversions  in  the
Philippines  were  also  largely  associated  with  privatization  operations  under  debt-
for-assets  schemes.  The sectors  eligible  for investment  under  the  scheme  included
bank  privatizations  and  export,  energy  and  agricultural  ventures.  Such  debt-
conversion  schemes  are  also  gaining  importance  in  Africa  and  Eastern  Europe  as
well.
7  World Debt  Tables 1990-91.  Extemal  Debt of Developing  Countries.  Volume 1. World Bank  Publications.
8  ENTEL  (the state telephone  company) was sold for a total of $214 million  in cash and $5.03 billion  in  Argentine
foreign  debL-7-
Finally, the  increased use of market based debt reduction  instruments  has
been facilitated by and, in turn, contributed to a marked growth in the importan.e of
the secondary market for the external debt of developing countries.  The volume of
nominal  claims  traded  on  the  secondary  market  is  estimated  to have  reached
around $70 billion  in 1990 from  around  $60 billion in 1989.9  Banks seeking to
restructure their portfolios to reduce their exposure levels account for much of the
market's  volume.  However,  non-bank  institutional  investors,  motivated  by
perceived high yields, are also becoming very active in the secondary market for
LDC  debt
III. The  Evolution  of  Short-Term  Lending  to LDCs.
The decline  in  syndicated  lending  by  commercial banks  to  developing
countries and the efforts of the countries themselves to tackle their debt overhang
problem via debt reduction and debt conversion schemes is a phenomenon which
has been widely covered in the recent literature (e.g. see Sachs (1989)). On the other
hand, very few studies  have analyzed the market for short-term bank lending to
LDCs. The role of short-term trade credit continues to be important  to LDCs, even
though  the  volume  of  MLT financing from  private  creditors  is on  the  decline.
There are a variety of instruments,  with varying degrees of complexity, that are
being  used  by  banks  to  provide  short-term  credits  to LDCs.  Apart  from  the
traditional  letters  of  credit,  creative  new  instruments  have  been  developed  to
finance LDC trade.1 0 Moreover, the "bundling" and "securitization" of short-term
9  Source: "[nternational  Capital Markets: Development  and Prospects.  May 1991.  IMF Publication.
10 Bmn, Richard  and Gooptu.  Sudarshan.  'The Role and Cost of Short-Term  Trade Credits"  in John D. Shilling  (ed.) Renond
Svnd*cazuIosm.  World  Bank  Technical  Paper  No. 163.  1992..8-
loans has allowed bank-  - ;  in the trade financing business,  without considerably
increasing  their  exposuie. 11 As  a  result  of  'he  increasing  dynamism  and
sophistication of the market for short-term finance, commercial banks'  short-term
claims on major non-industrial borrowers hitve increased from about $75 billion at
the end of 1978  to about $185  billion at the end of 1990.12  The increasing importance
of  short  term  commercial  bank  lending  to  the  heavily  indebted  developing
countries is also observed in the case or export credits that are insured by creditor
governments or their agencies (which may fall under the auspices of the Paris Club
in the case of credits from OECD creditors). Generally, short term insured  credits
have not been included in Paris Club reschedulings. This has motivated banks  to
extend insured short term  loans to developing countries, which are subseque..tly
rolled over, to finance investment projects (which should  typically be financed by
medium and long-term loans). In this way ba.nks can reduce the risk of having to
reschedule their insured credits to developing countries at the Paris Club.
The purpose of this paper is to discover some of the unknowns in the short-
term lending equation. This study will concentrate on the factors that  significantly
affect short-term lending by banks to LDCs in an endeavor to determine whether
these have changed over time and across counLcies. For this purpose, a sample of
seven countries was selected, nameiy, Argentina, Brazil,  Egypt, India, Kenya, Mexico
and Turkey.  This sample was chosen partly because it provides a wide geographical
11 In March  1990.  the US Eximbank  introduced  the "Bundlin;" program  for insured export  credits provided  by commercial
banks to LDCs. Under  this program,  a commercial  bank is permitted  to bundle  many smadl  and  diverse loans  to the
private sector !n LDCs into one large transaction  which, in tum, the Eximbank  guarantees.
"Securitization"  . which has oeen prevalent in the context of medium  and  long-term  debt restructurings  for seval  years.
is now being used more actively  as a way of restructuring  the short term  external  debt of developing  countries.
12  Source:  Institute  of International  Funance,  Washington,  D.C. It should  be noted that these  are in tenns of current prices
and therefore,  have not been adjusted for inflation..9.
coverage and, above all, because it is a heterogeneous sample of countries in terms
of their growth and external debt nxperiences.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico vwere  important beneficiarie- of the enormous
flows of  syndicated loans to LDCs during the late 1970s  which resulted from
the need to recycle the growing stock of petro-dollars  in the intemational
capital markets. After a period of overvaluation of their domestic currencies
and  rising  domestic  interest  rates,  all  three  countries  experienced  debt
servicing problems and had to reschedule their debts. Moreover, both Mexico
and Brazil declared a moratorium on their debt on 1982  and 1987  respectively.
In the last  month of 1982, the Mexican government reached  an agreement
with the commercial bank creditors in which they agreed to reschedule $?3
billion of claims due in 1982-84  and to provide $5 billion in new money.1 3 In
the case of Brazil, in 1988  the banks agreed to reschedule $61.5  billion of their
claims over 20 years and to provide further loans of $5.2 billion.1 4 In the last
few years, these three countries  have  looked for ways to reduce  ~.Leir debt
overhang  and  improve  their  economic performance.  While  Mexico and
Argentina have proved considerably successful, Brazil has still got a long way
to go.
Turkey  was  one  of  the  first  countries  whose  commercial  bank  debt
restructuring  agreement was negotiated with the participation of a third party
- the International Monetary Fund.  Reschedulings amounting to $9.6 billion
3 The Economist  Intelligence  Unit.  MEXICO  Country  Profile.  Annual  Survey  of Political  and Economic  Background  1991-
92.
14 The  ',.  womist  Intclligence  Unit. BRAZIL  Country Profile.  Annual Survey  of Political and Economic  Background  1991-
92-10-
were concluded during  1978-82.15  Since then Turkey's mnajor  debt indicators
have improved  significantly, contributing  to the international community's
increased confidence in the credit-worthiness of Turkey.  The debt to GDP
ratio has fallen from a peak of 60%  in 1987  to 42% in 1990  ,6 reflecting both the
recent rapid income growth  and appreciation of the Turkish lira.  Turkey's
total debt  to export ratio has declined steadily from over 330 percent in 1980
to 247 percent in 1987  and to 178  percent in 1990.17  Moreover, Turkey's access
to the commercial markets has  improved significantly. with full repayment
of botn the IMF and the previously reschedi'ed  commerciii bank debt service
obligations, accompanied by the significant build-up of reserves in 1989.
Egypt  has  been,  for  the  most  part,  unsuccessful  in  avoiding  repeated
reschedulings and debt servicing problems.  By 1990,  with an external debt of
ss- ne $50 billion,  Egypt  has  become  one  of  the  developing  world's  largest
debtors.18 Most of this debt has not been contracted from commercial banks,
but  is debt  on concessionary terms., consisting of development loans  from
governments and international institutions or trade credits (for the most part
guaranteed by official export credit agencies). Annual repayment obligations
amount to $4-5 billion.1 9 Egypt's  commercial bank debt is estimated at $1.5
billion, including publicly guaranteed  long-term debt of $389 million. 20 In
1990, several  projects  for  debt  conversion  (usually  in  conjunction  with
privatizations) have been undertaken by the Egyptian government in crder to
15  The  World  Bank
16 ibid
17 ibid
18 The Economist  Intelligence  Unit..  "EGYPT  Country  Profile,".  Annual  Survey  of Political  and  Economic  Badckgzund,
1991.92.
19  The World  Bank
20 ibid- 11
reduce  the  negative  impact  that  the  debt  problem  has  had  on  the  Egyptian
economy.  The results  of these measures,  remain  to be seen.
For  the  most  part,  India  has  relied  on  multilateral  donors  to  finance  the
development  plans  introduced  by  the  Indian  government.  However,  of late,
India's  foreign debt  has grown  significantly  relative  to its repayment  capacity.
In particular,  commercial  borrowing  has increased,  partly as a consequence  of
the inability of the official creditors  to fulfill India's  growing  need for external
financing  on  concessional  terms.  The total debt  was estimated  by  the Indian
Government  to be around  $57 billion  as of end-1990.21 Debt service  has been
close to $6 billion  in  the ! Lst  few years,  which has meant  a debt  service  ratio
(including  short-term  debt) of close to 30%. 22
Kenya  is still  relatively  favoured  by foreign  aid  agencies,  and  its receipts  of
official  development  assistance  (ODA)  have  held  up  well,  reaching  $866
million  in  1988 and  an  unconfirmed  figure  of  nearly  $1  billion  in  1989.23
Inflows  of aid  funds  have supported  Kenya's  public  capital  spending  and  its
balance of payments  deficit for so long that Kenya is described  as experiencing
a situation  of  "aid led  growth."  Besides the  aid provided  by  the U.S.A. and
Japan,  during  1988 and  1989, aid  agreements  were concluded  with  Belgium,
Denmark,  Finland,  South Korea and  China.  At. the end  of 1988, Kenya's  total
disbursed  external  debt  was  $5.9 billion,  of which  $331 million  was  short-
term,  $572  million  outstanding  to  the  IMF,  $744  million  private  non-
21 The Economist  Intelligence  Unit, " INDIA Country  Profile,".  Annual Survey  of Political  and Economic  Background.
1991-92.
22  ibid
23 The Economist  Intelligence  Unit, " KENYA  Country  Profile." Annual  Survey  of Political and Economic  Background,
1991-92..12 -
guarante_d  and  the  remaining  $4241 million  is  publicly  guaranteed.2 4 As a
result  of debt  forgiveness  from  different  donors,  Kenya's  debt  service  has
fallen  from  $696 million  in  1986 to  $594 million  in  1989.25 The  total  debt
service  has declined  over  the past  two years,  from 38.7% of exports  of goods
and  services  to 29.6% in  1989.26  Moreover,the  terms  of lending  to Kenya have
softened  over  recent  years,  with  average  inte;est  rate  on  new  public  and
publicly  guaranteed  borrowing  falling  from  5.1%  in  1983 to  1.9% in  1988.
Kenya's external debt at the end of 1989 stood at $5.7 biUion.
Table  1 shows  the  amounts  of short-term  indebtedness  of  seven  countries  in
our  sample  the  period  1980-1990 (in billions  of US dollars).2 7 The table shows  the
amount  of  uninsured  debt  outstanding  and  disbursed  from  commercial  banks  in
BIS reporting  countries  to the  private  and  public  sectors  of the  selected  developing
countries  having  an original  maturity  of  one  year  or  less28. Mexico,  Brazil  and
Argentina  have been  the  largest  borrowers  of short-term  money,  each of them  with
over  $5 billion of short-term  debt  stock every  year,  followed  by Turkey  which  only
surpassed  this figure  in 1990.  In the remaining  countries,  although  short-term  debt
has  almost  systematically  increased,  the figures  are  not  very  significant  in  absolute
terms.
24 ibid
25 ibid
26 ibid
27 Source  BIS. The Maturity  and Sectoral Distribution  of International  Bank Lending.  (1979-1990)
28 Raw data has been adjusted  for loans with original  maturities  of greater  than one year which  will be fully  amortized  in
less than one year. BIS statistics include these maturing loans with those having original maturities  of less than one year
when reporting  estimates  of short-term  lending  by banks to LDCs.TABLE 1: Evolution of Short-term Credits to Selected  Countries
(US$ Billions)
.......... ~~~~~~~~......,  ..  ~  ~~~~~~  A  V  er~~~~~o....  .......... -
=S4  1986 -1987  0I  0 
Argentina  9.3  10.0  11.0  12.6  12.1  13.0  7.5  7.7  6.5  5.2  6.4  9.2  2.7
Brazil  12.2  14.2  16.9  13.4  12.6  15.9  19.1  21.7  19.1  18.5  17.7  16.5  3.1
Egypt  2.0  2.8  3.1  3.4  3.3  3.1  2.5  2.6  2.0  2.3  2.2  2.7  0.5
India  0.4  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.5  2.2  2.4  2.2  2.6  3.6  1.7  1.0
Kenya  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.7  0.3  0.2
Mexico  15.5  24.2  25.2  24.9  11.7  14.3  9.0  10.8  9.1  11.2  15.7  15.6  6.3
Turkey  1.0  0.8  0.6  1.0  1.7  2.9  3.8  5.1  3.6  4.1  7.1  2.9  2.1
Source:  Bankforlneternational  Settlements,  "The  Maturity  and Sectoral  Distribution  of International
Bank  Lending",  various issues  (1979-90)
TABLE  2: Ratio of Short-term  debt to GNP
s...  ~  ~  ~  0
Argentina  16.6%  17.8%  21.1%  21.3%  16.7%  21.5%  10.1%  10.0%  7.4%  9.6%  6.4%  14.4%  5.8%
Brazil  5.4%  5.6%  6.3%  7.0%  6.4%  7.5%  7.4%  7.7%  6.1%  4.3%  3.8%  6.1%  1.3%
Egypt  9.1%  13.1%  13.0%  13.1%  11.5%  10.0%  7.8%  8.1%  7.2%  7.4%  7.0%  9.8%  2.5%
India  0.2%  0.3%  0.5%  0.5%  0.6%  0.7%  1.0%  0.9%  0.8%  1.0%  1.3%  0.7%  0.3%
Kenya  4.0%  3.1%  2.1%  4.1%  3.8%  4.5%  2.4%  4.9%  4.1%  5.4%  8.7%  4.3%  1.8%
Mexico  8.2%  10.1%  15.6%  17.9%  7.1%  8.2%  7.4%  8.1%  5.4%  5.5%  6.8%  9.1%  4.0%
Turkey  1.7%  1.4%  1.1%  2.0%  3.5%  5.7%  6.7%  7.7%  5.3%  5.3%  6.6%  4.3%  2.4%
Source:  World  Bank, DRS and  Bankfor International  Settlements,  "Maturity  and  Sectoral  Distribution  of
Internatioanl  Lending",  various  issues (1979.90).FIGURE  1: Ralio  of Short-term  Deblei GNP,  1980-90.
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Table 2 and  figure  1 show  the  ratio  of short  term  debt  to  GNP.  This  ratio
provides  an estimate  of the  magnitude  of short-term  debt  relative  to the size of the
economy.  Once  the  short-term  debt  figures  have  been  normalized  in  this  way  to
take  into  account  the  differences  in  the  size  of  the  countries'  economies  under
consideration,  it provides  a measure  for cross-country  comparisors  of the behavior
of short-term  debt  across time.
Argentina  is  clearly  the  country  with  the  highest  short-term  debt  to  GNP
ratio,  although  this  fraction  has  fallen  drastically  from  over  20% in  1985 to  6% in
1990.  Mexico's short-term  debt  to GNP  ratio  has also fallen considerably,  although,
in the Mexican case, the  sharp reduction  occurs between  1983-84, (immediately  after
Mexico's default  on  its long-term  debt).  When  this ratio  fell from  18% in  1983 to 7%
in  1984.  Brazil  follows  very  similar  patterns  to  Argentina  and  Mexico  with  a
noticeable  drop  in  the  ratio  in  1983  and  again  in  1987  and  a  declining  trend
thereafter.  However,  Brazil underwent  smoother  fluctuations  relative  to  the  other
two Latin American  countries.
Though  in  absolute  terms,  Egypt's  short-term  commercial  bank  debt  is not
significant as compared  to that of  Argentina,  Brazil or Mexico, Egypt's ratio of short-
term  debt  over  GNP  has  been  historically  comparable  to  that  of  large  debtors  like
Mexico or Argentina.  In fact, this  ratio  is even greater  than  that  for Brazil.  Egypt
also  experienced  an  initial  rise  and  then  a  decline  in  short-term  commercial  bank
financing  from  abroad,  particularly  after  the  1982 debt  crisis.  However,  for  this
country  the changes  are less dramatic  than those of Argentina  or Mexico.
The increasing  importance  of short-term  debt  in Turkey  is not only  visible in
absolute terms but also as a percentage  of its GNP.  With the exception of 1987, short-- 16.
term debt in Turkey has  consistently increased, rising from a 1-2% ratio  between
1980-83  to a significant level of 6% by 1990, a magnitude comparable to that of the
major LDC debtors.
Short-term borrowing has not played a major role in India in both absolute
terms  and relative  to GNP, although  the trend  is upward  sloping. 29 Kenya has
significantly increased its reliance in short-term borrowing from commercial banks
abroad, with short-term debt increasing from about 2 percent of GNP in 1982 to 8.7
percent of GNP in 1990.
IV. An Econometric Analysis  of Short-term  Lending:  Formulation  of  Relevant
Hypotheses
In  an  endeavor  towards  determining  what  factors  influence  short-term
lending  by  commercial banks  to LDCs and  how  it varies  over time and  across
countries an econometric analysis of the available data on the selected countries was
undertaken.  The choice  of  the  factors  examined  was  made  on  the  basis  of
discussions with officials in the Central Banks of several developing countries and
with a group of commercial banks that extend such credits to these countries.  Our
discussions with relevant parties indicated the following hypotheses whose validity
we test econometrically in this study:
*  At first hand, the influence of this factor of the ratio of total debt outstanding
and disbursed  to Gross National Product  (GNP) in determining a country's
access to short-term  trade  lines is unclear.  To the  extent  that  this  ratio
29  This may  have partly  been  as a result  of a cons:ious  policy  of the government  to discourage  its residents  from  extemnal
short term  borrowing.* 17  -
provides  a certain  measure  of the  debt  overhang,  one  would  expect  that  the
higher  the ratio,  the greater  are  he chances  that a country's  access to further
loans,  including  short-term,  will  be  curtailed.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is
possible  that  the  higher  the  debt  of  a  country  relative  to  the  size  of  the
economy,  the  greater  the  need  to borrow  from  abroad.  This  includes  short-
term  loans  from abroad.
*  The  ratio  of  medium  and  long-term  external  ;ebt  to  total  external  debt
outstanding  and  disbursed  can  be taken  as  a measure  of  a country's  debt
overhang  as  well  as  an  indicator  of  the  exposure  of  the  creditors  of  that
country. 3 0 Countries  with  high  levels  of  long-term  outstanding  debt  are
expected  to  receive  less  of  both  short-term  or  long-term  financing  in  the
future.
It is expected  that  short-term  borrowing  by  developing  countries  will fall as
the  volume  weighted  average  maturity  of the  portfolio  of  uninsured  loans
from  commercial  banks  increases,  i.e.  a  higher  average  maturity  of
outstanding  uninsured  loans  from  commercial  banks  at  any  point  in  time
implies  that banks  are  willing  to extend  a larger share  of medium  and  long-
term  loans  (out of their  total lending)  to entities  in the developing  country  in
question  due  to  an improved  perception  of  the  country  risk  associated  with
lending  to  that  country.  Higher  average  maturity  of  outstanding  external
loans  implies  a smaller  share  of short  term  debt in the  total  debt  portfolio  of
the debtor country.
30 As defined  in the World  Bank's "World  Debt Tables", medium  and long term external  debt consists  of debt that has an
original maturity  of greater than one year that is owed to non-residents  and is repayable  in foreign currency,  goods or
services.  This data does not include transactions  with the IMF. debt repayable  in domestic currency  or direct foreign
investnent.18  -
*  The ratio  of commercial  debt  to  total  debt  in a country  is expected  to have a
negative  impact  on  the availability  of future  loans.  The greater  the exposure
of banks  in  a  particular  country  (relative  to  its  GNP),  the  less williI,g  they
would be, as a group,  to lend to that country.
*  An  increasing  ratio  of investment  to  GNP  in a country  is expected  to have  a
positive  impact  on  the  country's  access to short-term  credit.  This  ratio  is an
indication  of  a  country's  future  growth.  Countries  with  optimistic  growth
outlooks  are expected  to be in  a better  position  as borrowers  than  those with
low  investment  levels.  However,  this  premise  wili  be  true  on  the
assumption  that  the investment  expenditure  incurred  today  is for productive
purposes  and  will,  indeed,  bear  fruit  in  the  future.  A high  investment  to
GNP ratio  may also send  a signal  to creditors  abroad  of increased  confidence
on the  part of domestic  economic agents  about  the future  performance  of the
economy.
*  The ratio  of  debt  service  to  exports  is  considered  by  most  banks  both  an
indicator  of  a  country's  credit-worthiness  and  possibility  of  repayment.
Countries  with  high  debt service to exports  ratio are expected  to be less likely
to receive financing  by banks.  They are  considered  to be very  vulhLerable to
changes  in  the  volume  or  the  terms  of  trade.  A  fall  in  exports  or  in
international  prices  can  severely  affect  their  possibilities  of  repayment  to
banks.  On  the  other  hand,  even  if  exports  do  not  fall,  many  banks  are
expected  to  refuse  to  provide  further  credits  to countries  that  have  already
reached  a  certain  threshold  of debt  service  payments  which  is regarded  as
being  too burdensome  for the country.  However,  the coefficient may also  be- 19 -
positive if the high debt service ratio is interpreted  as actual payments  that
were made to creditors abroad.  Even though this ratio is high, banks may be
willing to extend more short term loans instead of long term loans as a way of
reducing the risk of carrying bad  loans on th !ir books.  ST loans provide
banks with more flexibility than MLT loans.  So, as long as the country  is
making debt service payments  (represented by a high TDS/XGS ratio) the
bank will prefer to give it a ST loan instead of a MLT loan.  The distinction
between actual debt service payments and contractual debt service payment is,
therefore, crucial in this context.
*  The level of international reserves in a countr  is considered an indicator of
the short term liquidity position of a country.  .,ls factor expected to have a
positive  effect  on  the  availability  of  short-term  loans  to  that  country.
However, increasing levels of international reserves may reduce the demand
for external loans in the debtor country. Hence, the overall effect of this factor
on  the  actual  availability  of  short  term  external  credit  from  abroad  is
uncertain.
*  Officials in central banks and commercial banks perceive the cost of the credit
lines to be a major component in both the supply and demand functions for
short-term credits.  However, it is almost impossible to gather accurate data
on the "true" cost paid by borrowers for a short term line of credit.  Most
borrowers or lenders are not required to disclose the terms agreed and, even
when some rates  are quoted  these are not representative  of the "effective"
rates paid by the borrowing countries to banks.  In order to obtain an accurate
estimate of the rates charged by banks for such loans we would need to have
information on special fees and  up front payments made  by LDCs among-20 
other changes related to these transactions. For the purposes of this study, the
interest rate paid  to private creditors puL  shed by  the World Bank in the
World Debt Tables under the heading of average terms of new commitments
was  taken  as  a  proxy  of  the  spreads  paid  on  short-term  loans.  The
relationship  between  volume  and  price  is  not  a  priori  very  clear.
Conceptually, the demand for short-term loans is expected to fall as the price
increases.  However, it  is observed  that  some countries,  because of  their
excessive  dependence on trade as a source of income, need to borrow even at
the expense of paying very high spreads and other fees on these credits.
*  -The  conventional  notion  that  there  is  an  intimate  relationship  between
changes  in  the  trade  account  of  a  country  and  the  level  of  short-term
borrowing was tested. The general belief on this matter is that the higher the
trade deficit of a country the greater the amount of short-term trade related
credit a country would  acquire from banks  abroad.  In  fact, since we are
dealing with the total amount of short term loans rather than net short-term
flows (inflows less outflows), absolute trade flows (rather than only the trade
deficit)  may be important.
*  Finally, but crucial to this study  is the hypothesis that short-term  lending
might vary across countries and over time.  In some countries, short-term
external borrowing may be curtailed as a deliberate policy of the government
during  period of  scarce foreign exchange ( e.g. the Government would  ask
domestic  entities  to borrow  domestically  from  the  nationalized  banking
system at a controlled rate of interest and, in turn,  purchase foreign exchange
to meet their import and export financing needs). It has also been known that
the Governments of some countries, during  times of tight  domestic credit,-21 -
have consciously encouraged  domestic entities to endeavor  to finance their
short term import needs through external borrowing rather  than borrowing
from the domestic banking system. This hypothesis was tested by means of a
covariance model often used  to account for country and time-specific effects
using pooled cross-section and time series data. The basics of this model are
explained in the following section.
V. Methodology of the Econometric Analysis of Short-term Debt
The Data
Maybe the most cumbersome obstacle to a thorough understanding of short-
term finance is collecting reliable and detailed data. Because of the nature of trade
financing from commercial banks to developing countries it is almost impossible to
keep an accurate record of the flow of short-term credits to these countries. Most
transactions involve  only banks  and  exporters  or/and  importers  in  the trading
nations and, usually, unless the recipient country enforces exchange controls, little
or no disclosure is required by the governments of these countries. In particular for
the period before 1982,  when the rapidly escalating debt stocks were not considered a
problem by  the developing countries, almost no consistent data can be found.
However,  some  data  is  available  from  a  number  of  international
organizations  which  are  standard  sources  for  medium  and  long-term  external
indebtedness  statistics.  These include the BIS, OECD and  the Debtor Reporting
System of  the World Bank. However,  these sources contribute only partially  to
explain short-term  trade financing. In most cases, the data reported  as short-term.22.
debt does not only include short-term trade lines from commercial banks but also
bridge loans, accumulated arrears and inter-bank lines. A list and a description of
the different sources that periodically report on estimates of short-term debt of LDC
can be found in Annex 1.
Given the impossibility of finding accurate and consistent data on short-term
credits  from  the  debtor  countries,  and  becau-e  most  creditors'  sources  began
reporting their estimates for short-term debt after 1982,  we relied on the BIS  data in
the  "Maturity  and  Sectoral Distribution"  bulletins  published  since  1979.  Two
important considerations have to be kept in mind regarding the use of the BIS  data
on short term lending by banks to LDCs:  (i) The raw data was extracted from the
category of claims up to and including one year. However, because this data includes
longer-term credits reaching maturity within twelve months  of the reporting date,
further calculations were required to obtain those claims with an original maturity
of one year 31 and (ii) the BIS  data includes inter-bank lines as a component of  short
term claims. (a separate breakdown of which was not available).  Therefore, any
condusions drawn from this study should be treated with caution.
Model Specification
Two  main  models  were  tested  and  compared  in our  study  of short-term
credits. A pooled OLS regression for the period 1980-1990  and a Covarianme  Model
for the same period.  The pooled model assumes that the intercept and the slopes of
the model are constant. The implication of using this model in our study would be
31 Short-tcrm  bank credits for time period  (t) = bank claims of up to one yewr  for time  period  (t) minus bank claims of up to
one year in perimd  (t-1).-23.
to implicitly assume that  time or country-specific characteristics do not affect the
volume of short-term credit available to a country at any point in time.
To overcome this  limitation  of  the  pooled  OLS model  we estimated  the
covariance model on  pooled  cross section and  time series  data  for the  selected
countries.  In this model specification we included dummy variables which allow
for the intercept  term  to  vary  over time and  across country.  Therefore, in this
model we allow for intercepts to vary across time and across countries, but not the
slope coefficients. This model can be written as follows:
yitc+  hjXijt  + a2W2t  + i 3W3t +  *+  aNwNT  +  a2Zi2 + a3zi3 +  *  *+  aZ  +  ei
where  xi,t is a vector of j independent  variables  (j = 1 ... k) for the ith. country  and
(i = 1 ... N).
h.  is  a vector  of  regression  coefficients ("slope"  coefficients) for  the  jth.
dependent variable.
wit =1  for ith country i= 2, . ,N
O  otherwise
Zit =1  for tth time period t= 2,.  . .T
0  otherwise
In our study of short-term lending, dummy variables are included to account
for  all but one country  and  all but one year.  The dummy variable  coefficients
measure the differences in the country  and time intercepts with respect to the base-24-
(Argentina 1980).  Through  the introduction  of the country and year dummies  to
the pooled model it is implicitly being assumed that specific time periods and the
country to which short term  trade lines are being extended  are crucial factors in
explaining differences in the levels of short-term lending from commercial banks.
If this assumption  proves  correct, adding, the dummy variables  will allow us  to
compare the access to short-term credits by different countries over time.
It is important  to note that both the pooled OLS model and  the covariance
model  assume that  the  slope  coefficients of  the explanatory  variables  (Xj  s) are
constant.  In the context of our study, this will mean that the independent regressors
will have the same impact on short-term lending  regardless of the country or the
year we are considering. If the slopes were to vary as well, each separate country
regression would become a distinct model and pooling would be inappropriate.
In the econometric analysis conducted in this study, the simple pooled OLS
specification and  the covariance model were estimated using the same dependent
variable and  the independent  variables.  The dependent  variable (STGNP) is our
estimate ior short-term credits (estimated from BIS  data) expressed as a proportion
of  the Gross National  Product, in order  to account for the different sizes of  the
economies in our  sample.  The independent regressors which were included in the
analyses on the basis of  the hypotheses formulated in section IV are listed below:
EDTGNP:  Ratio of total external debt over GNP.
COMMEDT:  Ratio of commercial  debt over total debt.
TDSXGS:  Total  debt  service  on  long-term  debt  over  exports  of  goods  and
services.
TDEFGNP:  Ratio of trade deficit over GNP.-25 -
AVMAT:  Volume weighted average maturity of new commitments by private
creditors abroad to the country in question during any given year.
PRIVINT:  Average  interest  rate  charged  by  private  creditors  on  new
commitments.
LDOEDT:  Ratio of long term to total debt.
RESEDT:  International reserves to total external debt.
INVGNP:  Ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP.
In accordance with the hypotheses postulated in this paper, positive signs are
expected for the coefficients  of INVGNP  and RESEDT  if  greater the growth prospects
and the internatioiial liquidity of a country make it more likely for that country to
have  access to  short-term  financing  from foreign  banks ..  The coefficient of
TDEFGNP is expected to be positive provided we verify the conventional wisdom
that the higher the trade deficit of a country the more short-term lines a country
needs and eventually receives.  EDTGNP,  TDSXGS,  LDOEDT  and COMMEDT  are
included in our regression as credit-worthiness indicators which attempt to serve as
a measure of the debt overhang in a country.  A priori, we expect the signs of the
coefficient  of these variables to be negative.
As for the expected sign of the coefficient of PRIVINT,  we cannot provide a
definite answer.  The economic theory of Demand postulates that as the spreads on
short-term  credits increase, countries will look for alternative  ways of financing
their needs.  However, it has also been suggested by some in the profession that
because of the heavy dependence of developing countries on trade, LDCs are often
compelled to agree to paying (especially imports of essential consumer goods and
exports of primary products) the often usurious rates and fees on short-term lines
imposed on them by commercial banks.-26-
Apart from these independent variables, the covariance model will  include a
dummy for all but one of the countries (i.e. Argentina) and for all but one of the
years (i.e. 1980).  The choice of which country we assign as the "base" and which
time period we select is immaterial.  Any country or time period can be selected as
long  as  the number  of  country  dummies  is  one  less than  the  total  number  of
countries in our  pooled sample and  the number of time-specific dummies is one
less than the total number of years in the time series for each country.  A list of all
the dummy variables and their description is found in appendix  1.  A  priori, we
make  no  assumptions  about  the  signs  of  each  of  these  dummy  coefficients.
Inclusion  of  all  these  dummies  allows  us  to  ascertain  whether  the  country
concerned and the year in which the transaction occurs are factors which are taken
into account when short-term lines of credit are provided by banks to LDCs.
Empirical Results
The  empirical  evidence  on  the  determinants.  of  short-term  lending  to
developing  countries  supports  our  basic hypothesis  that  it  does  make  sense  to
differentiate  across  countries  and  over  time  in  order  to  understand  the
determinants of short-term commercial bank lending to LDC's.  This conclusion was
drawn after comparing the two alternative model specifications. The first regression
we ran was the simple pooled OLS model for a sample of 77 observations including
data  for seven countries of our  sample  (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India,  Kenya,
Mexico  and Turkey) for the period 1980-1990.  The regression results are provided in
Table 3 below.271-
Table 3.  Simple Pooled OLS: Regression  Results
Dependent  Variable  is STGNP
Number  of  observations:  77
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STO.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.1891287  0.0671656  2.8158557  0.006
EDTGNP  0.00112S4  0.0001442  7.8022293  0.000
COMMED-  0.0222728  0.0361849  0.6155266  0.540
TDSXGS  0.0009933  0.0004139  2.4001009  0.019
TDEFGNP  0.3315129  0.1278083  2.5938283  0.012,
AVMAT  -0.0028155  0.0017710  -1.5897595  0.117
PRIVINT  0.0006803  0.0020220  0.3364552  0.738
LDODEDT  -0.3264417  0.0606173  -5.3852934  0.000
RESEDT  0.0012458  0.0006346  1.9631391  0.054
INVGNP  0.1993478  0.1127075  1.7687183  0.082
R-squared  0.698071  M.ean  of dependent  0.069534
Adjusted  R-squared  0.657514  S.D.  of dependent  0.051448
S.E.  of  regression  0.030109  Sum  of squared  re3id  0.060738
Durbin-Watson  stat  0.915116  F-3tatistic  17.21184
Log  likelihood  165.8238
At  5% level  of  significance,  EDTGNP, TDSXGS, LDODEDT and  TDFGNP
were  found  to  be  statistically  significant  determinants  of short-term  credits,  while
INVGNP  and  RESEDT were statistically  significant  at the  10% level of significance.
The  signs  of  the  coefficients  of  INVGNP, TDEFGNP,  LDOEDT and  RESEDT are
consistent  with  our  a priori expectations.  Specifically, an improvement  in the  level
of  domestic  investment  in  a  country  and  an  increase  in  its international  reserves
will, indeed,  favorably  affect the country's  access to short-term  credits.  On the other
hand,  high levels of the external  indebtedness  in a country  will deter  creditors  from
supplying  further  short-term  loans  to  that  country.  The notion  that  there  is  an
inherent  positive  relationship  between  a  country's  trade  deficit  and  its  level  of-28 .
short-term  borrowing  was  tested  and  confirmed.  Signs  of  the  coefficients of
TDSXGS,  RESEDT  and  EDTGNP was hypothesized  to be uncertain.  In all these
cases, it seems as though an already highly indebted country will need and receive
more short-term  credits, so the positive influences are more significant than  the
negative  influence.
The second model run was the covariance model. In this model, each country
and  each time period is characterized by a different intercept, incorporated in the
regression by adding dummy variables. Table 4 shows the regression results.
At first  sight, this  covariance Model specification appears  to improve  the
statistical fit of our estimation  because the R2 is considerably higher than that of
the  pooled  OLS model.  However,  in  order  to  confirm  these  suspicions  the
covariance model was tested against the pooled OLS model.  The F test of the null
hypothesis that the intercept terms across countries and over time, taken together,
are equal was rejected at 5% level of significance  (F-Statistic  = 11.8,  as shown in Table
4).  Hence, it does matter that we account for cross-country and time differences in
our  econometric estimation procedures.  Therefore, our  hypothesis that time and
country-specific elements  determine  different  levels  of  short-term  lending  was
confirmed.  Consequently, the introduction of country and year dummies improves
the explanatory power of our model.
From the  group  of  independent  regressors, only  EDTGNP, INVGNP and
TDEFGNP  were found statistically at 5% level of significance. For all three of them
the sign of the coefficient  is positive..29-
Table 4:  Covariance  Model:  Regression  Results
Dependent  Variable  is  STGNP
Number  of  observations:  77
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STO. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C  0.0433326  0.0801966  0.5403298  0.591
EDTGNP  0.0008524  0.0002932  2.9074300  0.005
COMM£EO  -0.0339625  0.0529724  -0.6411357  0.524
TDSXGS  0.0007183  0.0004599  1.5617245  0.125
TDEFGNP  0.3716172  0.1477354  2.5154242  0.015
AVMAT  -0.0013094  0.0017494  -0.7484975  0.458
PRIVINT  -0.0009071  0.0025996  -0.3489547  0.729
LOODEDT  -0.0932386  0.0806346  -1.1563095  0.253
RESEDT  0.0003087  0.0007317  0.4218227  0.675
INVGNP  0.6573961  0.1466669  4.4822406  0.000
DUM81  0.0037928  0.0154048  0.2462078  0.807
DUM8Z  0.0055786  0.0165816  0.3364343  0.738
DUM83  0.0145232  0.0187528  0.7744532  0.442
DUM84  0.0078530  0.0180866  0.4341886  0.666
DUM8s  0.0028386  0.0193293  0.1468554  0.884
DUM86  -0.0164111  0.0223325  -0.7348532  0.466
DUM87  -0.0111909  0.0220303  -0.5079765  0.614
DUM88  -0.0316909  0.0210233  -1.5074175  0.138
DUM89  -0.0237928  0.0206153  -1.1541321  0.254
DUM90  0.0004545  0.0199035  0.0228362  0.982
BRADUM  -0.0799306  0.0213005  -3.7525179  0.000
EGDUM  -0.1070232  0.0587851  -1.8205834  0.075
INDUM  -0.1074409  0.0338127  -3.1775345  0.003
KENDUK  -0.1261226  0.0316327  -3.9870909  0.000
KEXDUK  -0.0779694  0.0202368  -3.8528546  0.000
TURDUM  -0.0956971  0.0263030  -3.6382so7  0.001
R-squared  0.852659  Mean  of  dependent  0.069534
Adjusted R-squared  0.780433  S.D. of  dependent  0.051448
S.E.  of  regression  0.024108  Sum of  squared  re3id  0.029640
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.278287  F-3tatistic  11.80546
Log likelihood  193.4454
Once again,  we confirmed  the hypothesis  that  countries  with  higher  growth
prospects  and/or  undergoing  trade  deficits will have priority  in the  access to short-
term  lines.  For EDTGNP the positive  influence  outweighed  negative  influence.  In
fact, EDTGNP was found  to be a very significant  factor with  a positive influence  on
short-term  lending.30-
Table  5.  Covariance  Model  without  year  dummies:  Regression  Results
Dependent  Variable  is STGNP
Number  of obaervations:  77
VAPRIA3LE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.1304054  0.0688763  1.8933256  0.063
EDTGNP  0.0004668  0.0002440  1.9129170  0.061
COMMLEDT  -0.0077680  0.0479850  -0.1618836  0.872
TDSXGS  0.0007939  0.0003819  2.0788944  0.042
TDEFGNP  0.4824192  0.1264331  3.8156086  0.000
AVMAT  -0.0013276  0.0015733  -0.8438736  0.402
PRIVINT  0.0013663  0.0017279  0.7907069  0.432
LDODEDT  -0.2000780  0.0686304  -2.9152954  0.005
RESEDT  0.0002392  0.0006140  0.3895616  0.698
INVGNP  0.4834743  0.1298440  3.7235010  0.000
BRADUM  -0.0758908  0.0183867  -4.1274910  0.000
EGDUM  -0.0126060  0.0431709  -0.2920017  0.771
INDUM  -0.0806910  0.0277556  -2.9071948  0.005
KENDUM  -0.0863234  0.0242996  -3.5524641  0.001
MEXDUM  -0.0672377  0.0180400  -3.7271522  0.000
TUtRDUM  -0.0698611  0.0203640  -3.4306191  0.001
R-3quared  0.814309  M.ean of dependent  0.069534
Adjusted  R-aquared  0.768647  S.D.  of dependent  0.051448
S.E.  of  regression  0.024746  Sum  of squared  resid  0.037355
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.366017  F-statistic  17.83347
Log  likelihood  184.5389
Regarding  the  dummies,  several  observations  need  to  be  made.  Although  we
found  that  the  covariance  model  (which  includes  the  dummies  for  countries  and
years)  improved  the  statistical  fit  of  our  regressions,  we  also  found  that  all  year
dummies  were  not  statistically  significant  at even  the  smallest  levels  of  significance.
Nevertheless,  it  is interesting  to  note  that  the  dummy  variables  for  1986 to  1989 had
negative  coefficient  estimates  implying  that  less  short-term  credit  was  available  to
these  counties  (across  the  board)  in  ihe  late  1980s. This  observation  coincides  with
the  period  of  successive  reschedulings  and  concerted  new  money  packages  in
commercial  bank  debt  restructurings  that  were  undertaken  in  these  countries
If-31 -
having  protracted  debt  servicing  difficulties.  Debt  and  debt  service  reduction
(DDSR)  deals  were  introduced  under  the  "Brady  Initiative"  in  1989  (with
agreements  in  principle  between  Philippines,  Mexico  and  Costa  Rica  and  their
respective  commercial  bank  creditors).  Hence, we ran  a third  model  including  only
the  dummy  variables  to  account  for country  specific factors.  Regression  results  are
provided  in Table 5.
We  found  the  restrictions  imposed  to  be  significant.  Therefore,  the
conclusion  to  %.  iiich we arrive  is that  time  or  specific years alone  do  not  affect the
volume  of  short-term  credits.  On  the  other  hand,  we  found  that  the  dummy
variables  for  the  countries  were  statistically  significant  at  very  low  levels  of
significance.  Thus,  we  conclude  that  after  we  control  for  all  the  independent
variables  there  is  a  country  specific  element  which  determines  that  one  country
receives  more  or  less  short-term  credits  than  another.  This  can  be  illustrated  in
figure  2  which  shows  plots  of  the  country-specific  intercept  terms  (henceforth
termed  as  "country-coefficients").  Because we have assumed  that  the impact of the
independent  variables  themselves  is  the  same  across countries  the  country  specific
element  in the provision  of short  term  credit  to LDCs by  banks  is explained  by  the
different  intercepts for each country  and  not by differences in the slopes.
It can be gleaned  from figure  2 that,  in our  sample,  Kenya  appears  to be the
lowest  in  priority  for  short-term  non-guaranteed  lending  by  commercial  banks.
India  and Egypt are the next lowest  in preference  and then Turkey.  Mexico is higher
in  the bankers'  performance  ordering  then  Brazil when  extending  short-term  loans.
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  intercept  terms  were  calculated  from  the
regressions with  Argentina  as the base  (i.e. the constant  term in the  regression  whenFIGURE 2: Country  Coefricients  from Regression  Estimates
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the values of all the "dummy" variables are assigned a value of zero represents the
situation of Argentina in 1980).
The country specific element "Argentina" (illustrated by the positive intercept
term, when all other dummy variables in the model take on the value of zero) has
positively affected the country's access to short-term lending, while the rest of the
countries in our  sample show a negative impact on short-term lending. For Brazil
and Mexico, the declaration of a moratorium on external debt service payments to
banks (in 1982  and 1987  respectively)  is often given as an explanation for the
curtailment  of  voluntary  lending  (both  short-term  and  long-term)  to  these
countries. In both these cases, particularly in the case of Brazil, short-term credit
lines have been maintained by banks only as components of the commercial bank
debt restructuring  "packages" that were negotiated between commercial banks and
the debtor country.  These components were not "voluntary" in nature.  Clearly,
involuntary lending by banks has resulted in a reduction of the short-term credits
available to these countries.
At the same time, there are demand side factors which can also influence the
volume of short-term  credits from commercial banks  that  a country holds  in its
portfolio at a given point in time. For example, until recently Kenya and India have
relied more on multilateral  agencies and official bilateral creditors rather  than on
loans from commercial banks to fulfill their external financing needs. Therefore, a
negative coefficient  for a country-specific  dummy variable can be partly explained by
the lack of demand for short-term commercial bank credits from the debtor country
at a point in time when it was able to obtain large amounts of official (or officially
guaranteed)  financing on  concessional terms. The more difficult it becomes for a
developing country to satisfy all its short term financing needs  dith insured export-34-
credits  from  official  sources,  the  higher  will  be  its  demand  for  commercial  bank
financing  -om  abroad.  Whether  this  demand  will, indeed,  be fulfilled  will  depend
on  the  banks'  willingness  to  supply  short-term  trade  credits  under  suitable  terms
and  the conditions  prevailing  in  the debtor  country  at the  time.
In  sum,  including  country-specific  dummies  in  the  pooled  OLS  model
increases  the  explanatory  power  of our  study.  The fact  that  the  country  specific
dummies  are  statistically  significant  and  different  in  value  implies  that  there  are
other  factors  or  events  particular  to  a  country  that  we  have  not  individually
identified  in our  models  which  account  for the  differences  in  the volume  of short-
term  credits  available  to  a  country  at  any  point  in  time.  This  in  itself  is a very
important  finding of this study.  Indeed,  the purpose  of including  a brief summnary of
the  debt  and  growth  history  of the countries  under  investigation  in  this  study  (see
section  1) was  a way of  acknowledging  the  possibility  that  the  mere  fact that each
country  is different  from  the  other  would  have  some  effect on  their  entry  into  the
market  for short-term  trade  financing  from financial  institutions  abroad.
VI. Condusions  and  Recommendations
Short-term  lending  by  commercial banks  to developing  countries  has been an
important  and  profitable  area  of their  business  activities.  From the point  of view of
the LDC debtors,  short  term  trade  lines have provided,  and  will continue  to be, the
life-line  for essential  consumer  goods,  such  as  medicines  and  food  supplies.  Our
discussions  with  relevant  officials in  developing  countries  has  revealed  that  short-
term  credits  from  private  sources  will  continue  to  be  necessary,  given  that  the
official sources do  not provide  enough  to LDCs for them  to be able  to meet all their
trade  related short  term  credit  needs.  In addition,  the continued  availability  of short-35.
term  credits,  even  if  they  are  extremely  costly  for  the  country,  is  an  important
consideration  before any  formal debt renegotiations  are envisaged.
Although  this  subject  is  an  important  one,  the  literature  on  the  subject  is
extremely  sketchy  and  scarce. Only recently  has reliable and  consistent  data  become
available  for  a  few  LDCs  which  has  made  it  worthwhile  to  embark  on  a  more
rigorous  analysis  of  the  determinants  of short  term  commercial  bank  lending  to
developing  countries.  In  order  to  get  a  clearer  picture  of  a  country's  external
payments  obligations  at any point  in time  and  to ensure  the availability  of pertinent
information  to  policy  makers  within  the  LDC governments  for them  to  devise  an
appropriate  external  debt management  strategy for their  country,  it will be useful  to
record such  disaggregated  information  on the country's  short  term  commercial bank
debt on  a systematic  and  consistent  basis. The quality of further  research  in the area
would  be  greatly  improved  if  such  information  is  widely  and  periodically
disseminated  among  all  interested  parties  in  both  academic  and  non-academic
circles.
In  an  endeavor  to  increase  our  understanding  of  the  determinants  of short
term  commercial  bank  lending  to  LDCs, an econometric  analysis  of  pooled  cross
section  and  time  series  data  for a sample  of seven developing  coui tries was carried
out.  We  tested  hypotheses  that  were  formulated  on  the  basis  of  numerous
interviews  with  market  participants  and  officials  in  the  central  banks  of  some
developing  countries.  In  this  respect,  we found  that  countries  with  higher  growth
prospects,  represented  by  higher  investment  to  GNP  ratios,  will  receive  greater
amounts  of  short-term  credits.  At  the  same  time,  we  confirmed  the  conventional
notion  that  short-term  credits  are  usually  intended  to  finance  countries  with
significant  trade  deficits.  Our  results  indicated  that  higher  levels  of  external^36  -
indebtedness (in terms of the ratio of total debt outstanding  to GNP) will be coupled
with higher levels of short-term external indebtedness from commercial banks (i.e.
the ratio of short-term debt to GNP will be high). Finally, but not least important, we
found  that there are country specific elements  which affect the volume of short-
term  lending available to a country. That is, even  if all other  things remain  the
same, some countries (e.g. Kenya) will find it more difficult to get easy access to
short term financing from commercial banks than others (such as Mexico). A more
detailed  analysis  of  each  country  would  have  to  be  undertaken  in  order  to
determine what unique factors explain the observed differences across countries in
their access to short-term credits. This is beyond the scope of this study. Factors such
as  the  track  record  in  the  implementation  of  World  Bank/IMF  structural
adjustment  programs,  the  existence of  domestic  financial markets  and  orderly
resolution of the country's external debt burden in conformity with a well thought
out  overall external debt management strategy  will go a long way in explaining
these observed differences. Finally, the robustness of the conclusions drawn  from
this study could be improved if a more detailed disaggregation of the data on short
term commercial bank lending, e.g. into categories such as inter-bank lines, short
term  bridge  loans  and  short  term  trade-related  credits, were  available  for  the
econometric analysis  of  the  determinants  of  short  term  lending  by  commercial
banks to LDCs.
Further work in this area would also have to examine the creditor side of the
market for short term financing to LDCs. This includes an in depth analysis of the
prospects  for  future  short  term  lending  by  financial institutions  to  developing
countries,  given  the  commercial  banks'  exposure  levels;  creditor  country  tax,
regulatory and accounting considerations which banks have to conform with; e- the
possibilities for renewed growth in the industrialized countries.Appendix 1
Sources and Definitions of Short-Term Debt data
BIS:  The Maturity and Sectoral Distribution of International Bank Lending.
This semiannual publication available since 1979  covers the claims of the
most important  international banks on developing countries. It presents two
categorizations of debt. The distribution by sector distinguishes between
claims on banks, non-banks and the public sector of the deveioping countries.
The distribution by maturity  distinguishes between loans up to and
including one year, over one year up to two years and over two years. The
category of claims up to one year includes lines with a residual instead of
original maturity of one year, therefore longer-term credits reaching maturity
within twelve months of the reporting date are included. Moreover, this
source does not separate trade bills from other short-term assets such as
working balances and inter-bank lines.
OECD: Financing  and Extemal Debt of Developing  Countries.
This annual  publication  available  since 1982 collects data  from the OECD
creditor  countries.  It provides  a breakdown  of short-term debt between  banks
and export credits.  The category of export  credits include loans that are
guaranteed  by  the  creditor governments  so that the lender  carries no exposure
risk. Bank lending in this survey  refers only to lending which is not officially
guaranteed by creditor countries. However, this category does not distinguish
between  trade  and  inter-bank  lines.
OECD-BIS: Extemal Debt Statistics.
This  annual  publication  available  since  1982 is compiled with  data  reported  by
creditor  banks  to the BIS and creditor  member  countries  to the OECD. A
breakdown  of short-term  trade  related  credits by banks and  non-banks entities
is provided. This source, however, does not distinguish between short-term
trade lines and other short-term financing as inter-bank lines.
World Bank: World Debt Tables
The principal  sources  of information  for these annually  published  tables are
the  reports  to  the World  Bank, through  the Debtor Reporting  System, from its
member countries  that have received either International Bank for
Reconstruction and  Development (IBRD) loans or International
Development Association  (IDA) credits. The short-term data is reported by
the debtor countries or are estimates derived from creditor sources. The
principal creditor sources are the semiannual series of commercial banks'
claims on developing  countries  published  by the BIS and  OECD. The World
Bank Debt Tables  do not provide  a distinction  between  trade  lines and  other
short-term claims on developing countries.Appendix
List of dummies  included  in the econometric  analysis
BRADUM: Dumm.y for Brazil
EGDUM: Dummy for Egypt
tNDUM:  Dummy  for India
KENDUJM:  Dummy  for Kenya
MEXDUM: Dummy  for Mexico
TURDUM:  Dummy  for Turkey
DUM81: Dummy  for 1981
DUM82: Dummy  for 1982
DUM 83: Dummy  for 1983
DUM84: Dummy  for 1984
DUM85: Dummy  for 1985
DUM86: Dummv  for 1986
DUM87: Dummy  for 1987
DUM88: Dummy  for 1988
DUM89: Dummy  for 1989
DUM90: Dummy  for 1990Appendix
List of Variables  included in the econometric  analysis. Definitions and  Sources.
Dependent  Variable:
STGNP: Ratio of short-term  debt  over  GNP. Estimated  with data  obtained  from the
the  Matiun,  and Sectoral Distribution of International  Bank Lending
published  by the  Bank of Intemational  Settlements.
Independent  Regressors:
AVMAT: Average  maturity  of new commitments.  World  Bank Debt  Tables.
COMMEDT: Ratio of commercial debt  over  total debt. Estimated with data obtained
from the World Bank Debt Tables.
EDTGNP: Ratio of total  extemal debt  over  GNP. World Bank Debt Tables.
INVGNP: Ratio of gross domestic  investment  to  GNP. Estimated  with data  obtained
from the World Bank Debt Tables.
LDOEDT: Ratio of long-term to total  debt. World Bak  Deb  Tabes.
PRIVINT: Average  interest  rate  charged  by pnivate creditors  on  new commitments.
World Bank Debt Tables.
RESEDT:  Ratio of international  reserves  to total  external debt.  World  Bank Debt
Tables,
TDSXGS:  Ratio of total debt  service on long-term debt over  exports and services.
World Bank Debt Tables,
TDEFGNP: Ratio of trade  deficit over  GNP. Estimated with data  obtained  from the
World Bank Debt Tables.Bibliography
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